People v. Policano, 9 N.Y.3d 583 (2007)
The legal standard for depraved indifference murder in New York evolved significantly between 2001, when Policano’s conviction became final under the Register standard, and 2006, when Feingold redefined the culpable mental state.
Summary
The Second Circuit certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the elements of depraved indifference murder at the time David Policano’s conviction became final in 2001. Policano was convicted of depraved indifference murder for shooting Terry Phillips multiple times. The Court of Appeals clarified that under the prevailing standard at the time (People v. Register), the focus was on the objective circumstances and the degree of risk created by the defendant’s conduct, not the defendant’s subjective intent. The court held that People v. Feingold which shifted the focus to the defendant’s mental state, should not be applied retroactively.
Facts
David Policano and Terry Phillips had a prior altercation. One evening, Policano, while selling bathrobes and smoking crack, encountered Phillips at a bus stop. Policano shot Phillips multiple times in the head, neck, and thigh. A witness observed the shooting, identifying Policano by his jacket. Phillips died from his wounds.
Procedural History
Policano was convicted of depraved indifference murder in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. Policano then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, which was initially denied but later granted based on People v. Gonzalez. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of habeas corpus and certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals to clarify the state of New York law regarding depraved indifference murder at the time Policano’s conviction became final.
Issue(s)
1. Whether, on June 28, 2001, under New York law, where the evidence indicated that the defendant committed homicide with the conscious objective of killing the victim, a jury could find the elements of depraved indifference murder satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. At the time Policano’s conviction became final, what were the established elements of depraved indifference murder?
3. Does the interpretation of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (1) and (2) set forth in People v. Payne and People v. Gonzalez, state the correct interpretation of the law of New York with respect to the elements of depraved indifference murder on the date Policano’s conviction became final?
Holding
1. Yes, because under the Register standard prevailing at the time, the jury could consider the objective circumstances of the shooting, which created a grave risk of death, even if the evidence suggested an intentional killing.
2. The elements were: (1) recklessly engaging in conduct (2) which created a grave risk of death to another person (3) thereby causing the death of another person (4) under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life.
3. No, because Register, not Payne or Gonzalez, stated the correct interpretation of the law at the time Policano’s conviction became final.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court emphasized the evolution of New York’s depraved indifference murder jurisprudence. Under People v. Register, the focus was on the objective circumstances and the degree of risk created by the defendant’s conduct, not the defendant’s subjective intent. The “circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life” were viewed objectively. The Court acknowledged that post-Sanchez decisions, including People v. Gonzalez and culminating in People v. Feingold, shifted the focus to the defendant’s mental state, requiring a culpable mental state of depraved indifference. The Court found this new interpretation should not be applied retroactively, as it would disrupt reliance on the old standard and potentially flood the courts with motions to vacate convictions. Quoting from People v. Sanchez, the Court noted that purposeful homicide itself is the ultimate manifestation of indifference to the value of human life. The court reasoned that at the time of Policano’s conviction, the jury was permitted to sort out the defendant’s state of mind, and strong proof of intent did not foreclose a finding of recklessness and depraved indifference. “[T]he focus of the offense is not upon the subjective intent of the defendant, as it is with intentional murder, but rather upon an objective assessment of the degree of risk presented by defendant’s reckless conduct”. The Court ultimately concluded that under the law at the time of Policano’s conviction, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find him guilty of depraved indifference murder.