9 N.Y.3d 12 (2007)
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A victim’s statement to police identifying the shooter is admissible under the Confrontation Clause as a non-testimonial statement when the primary purpose of the police questioning is to address an ongoing emergency.
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Summary
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Defendant Nieves-Andino was convicted of second-degree murder. The victim, Millares, identified “Bori” as his shooter to police shortly after being shot. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the admission of Millares’ statement identifying the shooter did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the statement was non-testimonial, made while police were addressing an ongoing emergency. The court emphasized that the officer’s primary purpose in questioning the victim was to assess the situation and prevent further harm, not to gather evidence for a future prosecution.
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Facts
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Millares was shot. Police arrived within minutes to find him injured with a crowd nearby. Officer Doyle asked Millares his name, address, phone number, and what happened. Millares stated that a man named Bori shot him and provided Bori’s address. O’Carroll, a witness, later identified Nieves-Andino as the shooter, stating he knew him as Bori. Nieves-Andino had previously sold drugs for Millares but began operating independently, leading to a dispute.
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Procedural History
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The defendant was charged with second-degree murder. He moved to exclude Millares’ statement identifying him as the shooter, arguing it violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The trial court denied the motion. The jury convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.
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Issue(s)
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Whether the admission of the victim’s statement identifying his shooter to police violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, where the statement was elicited during police questioning at the scene of the crime.
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Holding
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No, because the victim’s statement was non-testimonial, as the primary purpose of the police questioning was to address an ongoing emergency, not to gather evidence for a future prosecution.
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Court’s Reasoning
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The Court relied on Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington, which established that testimonial statements are inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The critical inquiry is whether the “primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency” (Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). The court distinguished this case from Hammon v. Indiana, a companion case to Davis, where the emergency had ended before the police questioning began. Here, Officer Doyle arrived at the scene of a recent shooting and, immediately after calling for medical assistance, questioned Millares. The court reasoned that, at that moment, the officer could not be certain that the assailant posed no further danger to Millares or to the onlookers. The Court stated, “the primary purpose of his inquiry was to find out the nature of the attack, ‘so that he could decide what, if any, action was necessary to prevent further harm’” (People v. Bradley, 8 N.Y.3d 124, 127 (2006)). The court concluded that the officer