American Committee for Weizmann Institute of Science v. Dunn, 10 N.Y.3d 82 (2007)
A party seeking to vacate a probate decree based on undue influence must establish a substantial basis for challenging the will and a reasonable probability of success on the merits.
Summary
The American Committee for Weizmann Institute of Science sought to vacate a probate decree, claiming a will was executed under undue influence and breached a contract to bequeath property. The New York Court of Appeals held that the charity failed to demonstrate a substantial basis for its challenge and a reasonable probability of success on the merits of its undue influence claim. The Court also ruled that correspondence between the decedent and the charity did not constitute a binding contract to make a testamentary provision because it lacked clear evidence of the decedent’s intent to renounce her right to alter her will.
Facts
Doris Dunn Weingarten died on January 16, 2004. Five days prior, she executed a will leaving her co-op apartment to her niece, Jennifer Dunn, and the residuary estate to other relatives. The American Committee for Weizmann Institute of Science (Weizmann) petitioned to vacate the probate decree, alleging undue influence by Irving and Jennifer Dunn and claiming a contract existed where Weingarten was obligated to leave Weizmann the co-op’s sale proceeds. Weizmann presented letters from 1994 and 1998 as evidence of the contract. They argued that a longstanding relationship existed and Weingarten always intended to donate to Weizmann.
Procedural History
The Surrogate’s Court dismissed Weizmann’s petition, finding that the contract claim was insufficient and Weizmann failed to raise a prima facie case of undue influence. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating there was no nonspeculative reason to allow discovery. The Court of Appeals granted Weizmann’s motion for leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the correspondence between the decedent and Weizmann constituted a contract to make a testamentary provision sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds (EPTL 13-2.1)?
2. What standard applies to a petition to vacate a probate decree brought by a nonparty to the initial probate proceeding based on “newly-discovered evidence” of undue influence?
Holding
1. No, because the correspondence does not indisputably demonstrate the decedent’s intent to renounce her right to freely execute a subsequent will during her lifetime.
2. A party seeking to vacate a probate decree based on undue influence must establish a substantial basis for its challenge to the probated will and a reasonable probability of success on the merits of its claim.
Court’s Reasoning
Regarding the contract claim, the Court of Appeals emphasized that freedom of testation is a jealously guarded right, and any promise to restrict that right must be analyzed closely for fraud. Agreements not to revoke prior wills demand the most indisputable evidence. The court cited Edson v. Parsons, 155 N.Y. 555, 568 (1898), noting such contracts are “easily fabricated and hard to disprove, because the sole contracting party on one side is always dead when the question arises.” Here, the 1994 and 1998 letters did not clearly evidence the decedent’s promise to bequeath the co-op’s proceeds to Weizmann; they were ambiguous and did not rise to the level of an indisputable promise.
Regarding the undue influence claim, the Court held that to establish entitlement to vacatur, a party must demonstrate a substantial basis for its contest and a reasonable probability of success through competent evidence that would have probably altered the outcome of the original probate proceeding. Permitting vacatur based upon mere allegations of undue influence would be unduly disruptive. The verified petition offered evidence of the decedent’s alleged intent in 1981, 1994, and 1998, but no evidence of her intent in the years prior to her death was presented. The court noted the will left the co-op to her niece, a close relative, whose father opened his home to the decedent while she received hospice care.