Matter of State of New York v. DD., 24 N.Y.3d 176 (2014)
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A civil commitment under Mental Hygiene Law article 10 cannot be based solely on a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), together with evidence of sexual crimes, as ASPD alone does not sufficiently distinguish a dangerous sexual offender from a typical recidivist.
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Summary
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This case addresses whether a civil commitment under New York’s Mental Hygiene Law article 10 can be based solely on a diagnosis of ASPD along with evidence of past sexual offenses. The New York Court of Appeals held that ASPD alone is insufficient to justify civil commitment because it doesn’t adequately differentiate between dangerous sexual offenders with mental abnormalities and typical recidivist criminals. The Court emphasized the need for a mental abnormality beyond a general tendency toward criminality to justify such commitment, highlighting concerns about due process and avoiding the use of civil commitment as a substitute for criminal punishment.
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Facts
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Two separate cases were consolidated for appeal. In the first case (Kenneth T.), the respondent had a history of rape and attempted rape. The State sought civil commitment based on diagnoses of paraphilia NOS (not otherwise specified) and ASPD. The expert testified that the paraphilia predisposed Kenneth T. to commit rape, and the ASPD gave rise to a serious difficulty in controlling the urge to rape. In the second case (Donald DD.), the respondent had convictions for rape and sexual abuse involving minors and an acquaintance. The State sought civil commitment based solely on a diagnosis of ASPD.
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Procedural History
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In both cases, the State initiated civil commitment proceedings under Mental Hygiene Law article 10. Both Kenneth T. and Donald DD. were found to have a mental abnormality and were ordered to be confined to secure treatment facilities. Both appealed, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the finding of mental abnormality. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed both decisions.
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Issue(s)
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1. Whether there was clear and convincing evidence that Kenneth T. had a “serious difficulty in controlling” his sexual misconduct within the meaning of section 10.03 (i)?
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2. Whether a civil commitment under Mental Hygiene Law article 10 may be based solely on a diagnosis of ASPD, together with evidence of sexual crimes?
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Holding
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1. No, because the evidence presented (that Kenneth T. carried out offenses in a way that would allow for identification and that he attempted a second rape after a long prison sentence) was insufficient to show a serious difficulty in controlling sexual urges.
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2. No, because a diagnosis of ASPD alone does not distinguish a sex offender subject to civil commitment from a typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.
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Court’s Reasoning
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The Court reasoned that the evidence presented regarding Kenneth T.’s difficulty in controlling his sexual misconduct was insufficient. The Court stated, “…they cannot consist of such meager material as that a sex offender did not make efforts to avoid arrest and re-incarceration.”
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Regarding Donald DD., the Court relied on prior Supreme Court rulings (Kansas v. Hendricks, Kansas v. Crane) that emphasized the need to distinguish between dangerous sexual offenders with mental abnormalities and typical recidivists to avoid turning civil commitment into a form of retribution. The Court noted that ASPD is prevalent among prison inmates (40-80%), and therefore, a diagnosis of ASPD alone cannot be the basis for civil confinement. The Court cited expert testimony that ASPD does not “in and of itself” show mental abnormality or predispose a person to commit sexual offenses. As the court noted, ASPD