Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute, 24 N.Y.3d 370 (2014)
A non-domiciliary medical provider is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York under CPLR 302(a)(1) based solely on responsive communications with a New York resident who sought out the provider’s services in another state, or under CPLR 302(a)(3) where the injury occurred outside of New York.
Summary
Frank Paterno, a New York resident, sought medical treatment from Laser Spine Institute (LSI) in Florida after seeing their advertisement online. Following surgeries in Florida, Paterno sued LSI in New York, alleging medical malpractice. The New York Court of Appeals held that New York courts lacked personal jurisdiction over LSI under CPLR 302(a)(1) because LSI’s contacts with New York were primarily responsive to Paterno’s initial contact and did not constitute transacting business in New York. The court further held that CPLR 302(a)(3) was inapplicable because the injury occurred in Florida, not New York. The decision emphasizes that merely responding to a patient’s inquiries does not equate to purposefully availing oneself of the privilege of conducting business in New York.
Facts
Frank Paterno, a New York resident, saw an online advertisement for LSI, a Florida-based surgical facility, and contacted them about his back pain. He sent MRI films to LSI in Florida for evaluation. LSI sent Paterno a letter outlining preliminary treatment recommendations. Paterno scheduled surgery at LSI in Florida after being offered a discounted rate. He exchanged emails with LSI regarding registration, payment, and travel arrangements. Paterno had blood work done in New York and attempted to arrange a conference call between his New York doctor and an LSI doctor. Following surgeries in Florida, Paterno experienced pain and contacted LSI physicians, who called in prescriptions to New York pharmacies. After further issues, he eventually had another surgery in New York with a different doctor.
Procedural History
Paterno sued LSI and its doctors in New York, alleging medical malpractice. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under CPLR 3211(a)(8). The Supreme Court granted the motion, dismissing the case. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that LSI was not transacting business in New York under CPLR 302(a)(1) and that CPLR 302(a)(3) was inapplicable because the injury did not occur in New York. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether LSI’s contacts with New York constituted transacting business within the state under CPLR 302(a)(1), thus conferring personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
2. Whether LSI committed a tortious act outside New York causing injury within the state under CPLR 302(a)(3), thus conferring personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
Holding
1. No, because LSI’s activities were primarily responsive to the plaintiff’s initial contact and did not demonstrate a purposeful availment of conducting business in New York.
2. No, because the injury occurred in Florida where the surgeries took place, not in New York where the plaintiff experienced the consequences of the injury.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that under CPLR 302(a)(1), a non-domiciliary transacts business when they purposefully avail themselves of conducting activities within New York, establishing a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim. The court emphasized that the "overriding criterion" is whether the non-domiciliary "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [New York]." Paterno initiated contact with LSI after seeing their online advertisement, which the court deemed a passive website. The court stated, "[i]t is not the quantity but the quality of the contacts that matters under our long-arm jurisdiction analysis." LSI’s subsequent communications were responsive to Paterno’s inquiries and facilitated his decision to undergo surgery in Florida. Contacts after the surgeries cannot form the basis of jurisdiction because "there [must be] a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted." Citing Etra v. Matta, the court noted that even sending an experimental drug to New York and acting as a consultant to a New York doctor was insufficient to constitute a transaction of business. Extending jurisdiction in this case would set a precedent for almost limitless jurisdiction over out-of-state medical providers. Regarding CPLR 302(a)(3), the court determined that the injury occurred in Florida, where the surgeries were performed, not in New York, where Paterno experienced the pain and consequences of the alleged malpractice. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.