<strong><em>People v. Gray</em>, 27 N.Y.3d 77 (2016)</em></strong>
Defense counsel’s strategic decision not to pursue a potentially fruitless motion to reopen a suppression hearing, when that decision was based on a reasonable assessment of the law and facts, does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
<strong>Summary</strong>
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether defense counsel’s failure to move to reopen a suppression hearing constituted ineffective assistance. During trial, a detective’s testimony differed from his prior suppression hearing testimony, potentially strengthening the defendant’s argument for suppressing his post-Miranda statements. However, the Court held that counsel’s strategic decision not to pursue the motion, based on the slim chance of success and a desire to use the pre-break statement to undermine the post-break statement’s credibility, was reasonable under the circumstances. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that counsel provided effective assistance.
<strong>Facts</strong>
A detective interrogated the defendant, giving oral Miranda warnings before obtaining an initial statement. The detective then re-read Miranda warnings from an NYPD form after a 45-minute break, and the defendant made another statement. Initially, the court suppressed both statements due to incomplete Miranda warnings. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the second statement attenuated. At trial, the detective’s testimony varied, and the defense counsel, knowing the Appellate Division had already found the second statement admissible and understanding the high likelihood of admission given the totality of the circumstances, chose not to move to reopen the suppression hearing. Defense counsel’s strategy was to use the first statement, which he knew would be admitted, to cast doubt on the second statement.
<strong>Procedural History</strong>
A suppression hearing was held, followed by the suppression of the statements by the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed the suppression order. At trial, the defendant was convicted of murder. After the conviction, defendant moved to vacate the judgment, claiming ineffective assistance due to counsel’s failure to move to reopen the suppression hearing. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
<strong>Issue(s)</strong>
1. Whether defense counsel’s failure to move to reopen the suppression hearing based on the detective’s trial testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
<strong>Holding</strong>
1. No, because counsel’s strategic decision not to move to reopen the hearing was reasonable given the circumstances and the slim chance of success.
<strong>Court's Reasoning</strong>
The Court relied on the principle that an attorney’s strategic choices are generally not grounds for ineffective assistance claims, particularly if those choices have a reasonable basis. The Court found that counsel’s decision not to move to reopen the suppression hearing was strategically sound. The Court emphasized the low probability of success had counsel moved to reopen, given the Appellate Division’s prior ruling on attenuation. Furthermore, the court recognized that the detective’s trial testimony, even if different from his earlier testimony, still strongly suggested attenuation. The court highlighted CPL 710.40 (4) and the need for